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Abstract 
We explore whether priming emotion versus deliberation affects speciesism—the tendency to 
prioritize certain individuals over others on the basis of their species-membership (three main 
and two supplementary studies; four pre-registered; N = 3,288). We find that the tendency to 
prioritize humans over animals (anthropocentric speciesism) decreases when participants were 
asked to think emotionally compared to deliberately. In contrast, the tendency to prioritize dogs 
over other animals (pet speciesism) increases when participants were asked to think 
emotionally compared to deliberately. We hypothesize that, emotionally, people like animals 
in general, and dogs in particular; however, deliberatively, people attribute higher moral status 
to humans than animals, and roughly equal status to dogs, chimpanzees, elephants and pigs. In 
support of this explanation, participants tended to discriminate between animals based on 
likability when thinking emotionally and based on moral status when thinking deliberately. 
These findings shed light on the psychological underpinnings of speciesism. 
 
Keywords: speciesism, moral judgment, animals, dual-process   
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Liking but Devaluing Animals: Emotional and Deliberative Paths to Speciesism 
Most of us are speciesist. We value certain beings more than others simply on the basis 
of their species-membership—a term that philosophers have coined speciesism (Singer, 
1975). Speciesism manifests itself in two key ways. First, we usually value humans more 
than (other) animals. We exploit animals for consumption, medical experiments, hunt them 
for our entertainment, and do not grant even the most intelligent of them—chimpanzees—
basic rights. Second, we value some animals more than others. For example, while we give 
love and devotion to pets such as dogs, other animals—such as pigs or chickens—live 
miserable lives in factory farms. 
While philosophers have studied questions of how we treat and should treat animals for 
decades (e.g., Kagan, 2016; Regan, 1987; Singer, 1975), if not centuries (e.g., Bentham, 
1780), psychologists have started to investigate the psychology of speciesism only in recent 
years (Amiot & Bastian, 2015; Caviola, Everett, & Faber, 2019; Dhont, Hodson, & Leite, 
2016; Dhont, Hodson, Loughnan, & Amiot, 2019). Most of this research has focused on what 
we call anthropocentric speciesism: the fact that we value humans more than animals. This 
research has shown that anthropocentric speciesism shares properties with other forms of 
prejudice such as racism and sexism, in that it is underpinned by similar socio-ideological 
beliefs such as social dominance orientation (Caviola, Everett, et al., 2019; Dhont, Hodson, 
Costello, & MacInnis, 2014; Dhont et al., 2016; Everett, Caviola, Savulescu, & Faber, 2018).  
Less research has focused on the second aspect of speciesism; the fact that we value 
certain non-human animals more than others. This aspect shows, for example, in the 
observation that we value pet animals over animals categorized as food, experimental 
subjects, wildlife, equipment, entertainment, or pests (Amiot & Bastian, 2015; Bratanova, 
Loughnan, & Bastian, 2011; Leite, Dhont, & Hodson, 2018). We will focus on the tendency 
to value pet animals (e.g., dogs) over other animals, which we refer to as pet speciesism. 
Previous work has shown that anthropocentric speciesism and pet speciesism are 
psychologically related (Caviola, Everett, et al., 2019). For example, anthropocentric 
speciesism, as measured by the Speciesism Scale, predicts a stronger tendency to help dogs 
than pigs. However, while items capturing pet speciesism correlated with anthropocentric 
speciesism, the correlation was only moderate, suggesting that the two factors are, to some 
extent, psychologically distinct. 
In this paper we investigate anthropocentric and pet speciesist attitudes using a dual-
process lens. Are people more or less speciesist when they think emotionally or deliberately 
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respectively? Are anthropocentric and pet speciesist attitudes affected differently by 
emotional and deliberative thinking? And if so, how can we explain this difference?  
Answering these questions could shed light on the psychological mechanisms that underpin 
people’s attitudes and behavior towards animals.  
Previous research has investigated how moral judgments are driven by emotional (or 
intuitive) and deliberative processes, i.e., the dual-process theory of moral judgment (Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). Most notably in the context of utilitarian 
psychology, it has been shown that people are less willing to engage in instrumental harm for 
the greater good (e.g., to harm one in order to save many) when they think emotionally than 
deliberately (for review, cf. Capraro, 2019; Greene et al., 2001; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Patil et al., 2018; Timmons & Byrne, 2019; Trémolière, Neys, & 
Bonnefon, 2012). In contrast, impartial beneficence remains unaffected by a manipulation 
that induces people to think emotionally or deliberately (Capraro, Everett, & Earp, 2019). 
Impartial beneficence is another, psychologically distinct aspect of utilitarian psychology and 
captures the tendency to treat all beings equally (Kahane et al., 2018). This finding is relevant 
for our purpose since anti-speciesism—the tendency to not discriminate beings on the basis 
of their species-membership—is an implication of impartial beneficence. This finding, 
therefore, could suggest that both forms of speciesism would also remain unaffected by such 
a manipulation. Similarly, previous meta-analyses found human altruism—towards an 
unspecified person measured through the anonymous dictator game—to be unaffected by 
cognitive process manipulations that induce either intuitive/emotional or deliberative thinking 
(Fromell, Nosenzo, & Owens, 2018; Rand, Brescoll, Everett, Capraro, & Barcelo, 2016). To 
the extent that anthropocentric anti-speciesism is a form of altruism (towards an unspecified 
animal), also this line of research seems to suggest that (at least) anthropocentric speciesism 
would remain unaffected by such manipulations. 
Other research suggests that inducing emotional or deliberative thinking could affect 
speciesism. For example, the social heuristic hypothesis (Bear & Rand, 2016; Rand, 2016; 
Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012; Rand et al., 2014) assumes that people tend to be more 
cooperative (in social dilemmas such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the public goods game, 
played (with other, unspecified, people) when thinking intuitively than deliberately. To the 
extent that anthropocentric anti-speciesism is a form of cooperation (with generic, 
unspecified, animals), this framework suggests that emotional thinking would reduce (at 
least) anthropocentric speciesism. Finally, the fact that anthropocentric speciesism correlates 
negatively with empathy (Caviola, Everett, et al., 2019) may also suggest that more 
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emotional thinking would reduce anthropocentric speciesism, via increased empathic concern 
for animals.  
In sum, it is not obvious whether thinking emotionally or deliberately affects speciesism 
and, if it does, in which direction. Similarly, it is not obvious whether emotion and 
deliberation affects anthropocentric speciesism differently than pet speciesism. 
The Present Research 
This paper presents three main experiments that test whether speciesism is affected by a 
conceptual priming manipulation that prompts people to think either emotionally or 
deliberately. Study 1 relies on a moral prioritization dilemma in which it has to be decided 
whether to save a human vs. a chimpanzee (anthropocentric speciesism), or a dog vs. a pig 
(pet speciesism). Study 2 replicates the findings using a donation task and provides evidence 
that discrepancies in perceived likability and moral status attribution drive pet and 
anthropocentric speciesism, respectively. Study 3 replicates the findings using a broader 
range of measures and stimuli. Two additional studies, measuring anthropocentric speciesism 
by the Speciesism Scale, are reported in the supplementary material. 
Open science. Reports of all measures, manipulations, and exclusions, as well as all 
data, analysis code, and experimental materials are available for download at 
https://osf.io/2es39/. 
Ethics statement. For all studies, relevant ethical guidelines were followed and the 
research was approved through University of Oxford’s Central University Research Ethics 
Committee, with the reference number MS-IDREC-R56657/RE002. 
 
Study 1 
In the first study we aimed to investigate whether and how emotional or deliberative 
thinking affects both anthropocentric and pet speciesism. As in Caviola, Schubert, Kahane & 
Faber (2019), we relied on a moral dilemma in which participants had to decide which out of 
two beings they would rather save: a choice between a human or a highly intelligent 
chimpanzee, or between a dog or a pig.  
In two supplementary studies we found that anthropocentric speciesism, as measured by 
the Speciesism Scale (Caviola, Everett, et al., 2019), is reduced when participants are asked 
to think emotionally compared to deliberatively. We therefore hypothesized that prioritization 
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of the human over the chimpanzee (anthropocentric speciesism) increases under deliberation 
compared to emotion. At the same time, we hypothesized that prioritization of dogs over pigs 
(pet speciesism) does not increase under deliberation compared to emotion. This is because 
we assumed that under deliberation people would consider pigs and dogs to be of similar 
moral status. 
The study had a 2 (condition: emotion vs. deliberation) x 2 (speciesism: anthropocentric 
vs. pet) between-subjects design and was pre-registered at https://aspredicted.org/pm2br.pdf.  
Methods 
Participants. We recruited 805 US American participants online via MTurk. They 
received $0.18 (in line with US minimum wage) for their participation. 145 were excluded 
for failing the manipulation check, leaving a final sample of 660 people (358 female, Mage = 
38.74, SDage = 11.96). A priori power analysis showed that 651 participants were required to 
detect an effect size of f = 0.11 with an α of 0.05, power of 0.80 and 4 groups. We aimed to 
recruit 800 participants to account for any exclusions.  
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to either the emotion or deliberation 
condition. They were first presented with the manipulation, which was based on Levine, 
Barasch, Rand, Berman, and Small (2018). It was explained that “sometimes people make 
decisions by using logic and relying on their reason. Other times, people make decisions by 
using feelings and relying on their emotions.” In the emotion condition, they were then 
encouraged to rely on emotion when answering the following questions, since “many people 
believe that emotion leads to good decision-making”. In the deliberation condition, they were 
encouraged to rely on reason when answering the following questions, “since many people 
believe that reason leads to good decision-making”. 
Next, participants were presented with a moral dilemma (cf. Caviola, Schubert, et al., 
2019) in which they could only save one out of two beings: “In some difficult situations, one 
cannot help everyone. Sometimes one can only save the life, treat the illness, or relieve the 
pain of some but not of others. (…) Imagine a situation in which you could only help one of 
these two beings.” In the human condition, participants had to decide between saving either a 
human or a chimpanzee with a very high level of intelligence. In the dog condition, they had 
to decide between saving either a dog or a pig. Participants responded on a 7-point scale (1 = 
Definitely human/dog, 4 = Flip a coin to decide, 7 = Definitely chimpanzee/pig; scores 
reported in reverse below). Finally, participants responded to demographic questions. 
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Results 
The results showed that people in general had a strong tendency to prioritize the human 
over the chimpanzee and the dog over the pig (Figure 1). The tendency to prioritize the 
human over the chimpanzee was stronger than the tendency to prioritize the dog over the pig, 
F(1, 656) = 20.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .03, 95% CI [.01, .06]. 
There was a significant interaction effect F(1, 656) = 38.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .06, 95% CI 
[.03, .09]. The tendency to prioritize a human over a chimpanzee was stronger in the 
deliberation (M = 6.42, SD = 1.20) compared to the emotion condition (M = 5.97, SD = 1.57). 
In contrast, the tendency to prioritize a dog over a pig was stronger in the emotion (M = 6.15, 
SD = 1.13) condition compared to the deliberation condition (M = 5.23, SD = 1.69).  
 
Figure 1. The tendency to prioritize a human over a chimpanzee was stronger when 
participants were asked to rely on deliberation compared to emotion. In contrast, the tendency 
to prioritize a dog over a pig was stronger when participants were asked to rely on emotion 
compared to deliberation. 1 stands for prioritizing the “inferior” species (chimpanzee or pig), 
4 stands for Flip a coin to decide, 7 stands for prioritizing the “superior” species (human or 
dog). Black points represent raw data, horizontal bars represent means, rectangles represent 
confidence intervals, and “violins” represent smoothed densities. 
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Discussion 
This first study provides initial evidence that anthropocentric speciesism increases under 
deliberation compared to emotion and that pet speciesism decreases under deliberation 
compared to emotion. In Study 2 we explore this interaction effect in more detail. 
Study 2 
Study 2 had two aims. First, we wanted to test whether the interaction effect would 
replicate in a charitable giving context, which is more realistic than the hypothetical 
prioritization dilemma of Study 1. Our first hypothesis was that people would donate more to 
a charity helping humans instead of animals under deliberation than under emotion; and, that 
people would donate more to a charity helping dogs instead of pigs under emotion than under 
deliberation. 
Second, we aimed to better understand the interaction effect. Our hypothesis was that 
when people think emotionally, they primarily base their decision on how much they 
personally like the respective beings; but when people think deliberately, they primarily base 
their decision on how much moral status they believe the respective beings deserve. We 
hypothesized that the two can come apart. The extent to which people like a being might be 
determined by more emotional factors (e.g., empathy) and the extent to which people 
attribute moral status to a being might be determined more by deliberative factors or 
“reasons” (e.g., what mental capacities the being has or to what species it belongs to) 
(Caviola, Schubert, et al., 2019; Haslam, Bastian, Laham, & Loughnan, 2012). This could 
also explain why people are willing to eat animals despite generally liking animals (Piazza & 
Loughnan, 2016). 
Similar to Study 1, this study had a (condition: emotion vs. deliberation) x 2 (speciesism: 
anthropocentric vs. pet) between-subjects design and was pre-registered at 
https://aspredicted.org/vm6m4.pdf. 
Methods 
Participants. We recruited 595 US American participants online via MTurk. They 
received $0.18 for their participation. 87 were excluded for failing the manipulation check, 
leaving a final sample of 508 people (282 female, Mage = 41.05, SDage = 12.26). A priori 
power analysis showed that 467 participants were required to detect an effect size of f = 0.13 
LIKING BUT DEVALUING ANIMALS 
 
9 
with an α of 0.05, power of 0.80 and 4 groups. We aimed to recruit 600 participants to 
account for any exclusions.  
Procedure. The emotion/deliberation manipulation was identical to the one in the 
previous studies. Next, participants were presented with a donation task. Participants were 
asked how they would distribute $100 between two charities. Charity A focused on helping 
humans [dogs] and Charity B focused on helping animals [pigs]. Note that in contrast to the 
previous study, this study used ‘animals’ instead of ‘chimpanzees’. The amounts donated to 
the two charities had to add up to 100. Next, participants responded to the same manipulation 
check as in the previous studies. 
Next, they were asked two follow-up questions. First, likability: “Personally, which type 
of beings do you like more—animals [pigs] or humans [dogs]?” on a 7-point scale (1 = I like 
animals [pigs] much more, 4 = I like both equally, 7 = I like humans [dogs] much more). 
Second, moral status attribution: “From a purely ethical perspective, which types of beings 
should matter more morally—animals [pigs] or humans [dogs]?” on a 7-point scale (1 = 
Animals [Pigs] should matter much more, 4 = Both should matter equally, 7 = Humans 
[Dogs] should matter much more). Finally, participants responded to demographic questions. 
Results 
The results replicated the findings of Study 1. In general, participants donated more to 
help humans than animals and more to help dogs than pigs. Relative donations to help dogs 
were greater than relative donations to help humans, F(1, 504) = 5.09, p = .02, ηp2 = .01, 95% 
CI [0, .03]. 
There was a significant interaction effect F(1, 504) = 44.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, 95% CI 
[.04, .13] (Figure 2). The tendency to donate more to help humans than animals was stronger 
in the deliberation condition (M = 72.86, SD = 22.54) compared to the emotion condition (M 
= 55.2, SD = 30.74). In contrast, the tendency to donate more to help dogs than pigs was 
stronger in the emotion (M = 74.36, SD = 21.21) condition compared to the deliberation 
condition (M = 63.31, SD = 21.77).  
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Figure 2. Participants donated more to help humans than animals when thinking deliberately 
compared to emotionally. In contrast, participants donated more to help dogs than pigs when 
thinking emotionally compared to deliberately. 50 means that participants split their 
donations equally to both charities. Amounts higher than 50 mean that they donated more to 
help humans (or dogs) than animals (or pigs). Black points represent raw data, horizontal bars 
represent means, rectangles represent confidence intervals, and “violins” represent smoothed 
densities. 
 
Participants liked humans and animals roughly equally (M = 4.11, SD = 1.68), t(254) = 
1.08, p = .28, d = .07, 95% CI [-.05, .18]. However, participants believed that humans deserve 
much higher moral status than animals (M = 5.25, SD = 1.39), t(254) = 14.35, p < .001, d = 
.90, 95% CI [.76, 1.03]. The reverse was true in the pet speciesism conditions. Participants 
liked dogs much more than pigs (M = 5.7, SD = 1.23), t(254) = 21.86, p < .001, d = 1.37, 
95% CI [1.19, 1.50]. However, participants believed that, from an ethical perspective, dogs 
deserve only slightly higher moral status than pigs (M = 4.48, SD = 0.93), t(254) = 8.20, p < 
.001, d = 0.51, 95% CI [.40, .64]. 
Using linear regression, we found that both likability and moral status significantly 
predicted donations (Table 1). Crucially, we found that the signs of the interaction terms for 
(a) likability and condition and (b) moral status and condition went in opposite directions. 
Specifically, in the deliberation condition moral status predicted donations more strongly than 
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likability, and that in the emotion condition likability predicted donations more strongly than 
moral status. We decomposed the interaction by conducting two additional regressions 
without the interaction term with the two condition samples separately. In the deliberation 
condition, the moral status coefficient was much greater than the likability coefficient, and in 
the emotion condition the moral status coefficient was much smaller than the likability 
coefficient.  
 
Table 1. Unstandardized coefficients of regression analysis for the full sample or the two 
condition samples separately (Study 2) 
Sample Full Deliberation Emotion 
R2 0.52 0.33 0.63 
Likeability 11.18** [10.04, 12.31] 3.69** [2.29, 5.09] 11.18** [10.09, 12.26] 
Moral Status 4.19** [2.61, 5.77] 8.97** [7.14, 10.79] 4.19** [2.68, 5.69] 
Condition   4.50* [1.66, 7.35]   
Likability x 
Condition 
-7.48** [-9.24, -5.73]   
Moral Status x 
Condition 
4.78** [2.43, 7.13]   
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .001. Square brackets display 95% confidence intervals. The continuous 
predictors were mean-centered. The emotion condition was coded as 0 and the deliberation 
condition as 1. 
 
Discussion 
The findings confirm that anthropocentric speciesism is reduced under emotion 
compared to deliberation, but that pet speciesism is increased under emotion compared 
deliberation. This study demonstrates that this tendency does not only show in hypothetical 
prioritization dilemmas but also in more real-world charitable giving behavior. 
Furthermore, the findings propose an explanation for this effect. When thinking 
emotionally, people prioritize the types of beings that they personally like more. When 
thinking deliberately, people prioritize the types of beings that they believe deserve higher 
moral status. People attribute much higher moral status to humans than animals despite liking 
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both about equally. In contrast, people attribute almost the same moral status to dogs and pigs 
despite liking dogs much more than pigs.  
Study 3 
In Study 3 we aimed to replicate the findings from the previous studies with a broader 
range of stimuli and measures in order to increase reliability. While we relied on one-item 
measures in the previous studies, in this study we relied on three-item ad-hoc scales to 
measure prioritization tendencies in moral dilemmas, likability and moral status attribution. 
Further, while we previously measured the two types of speciesism with just a single species-
contrast (e.g., dogs vs. pigs for pet speciesism), in this study we relied on three species-
contrasts each to measure the two types of speciesism. More specifically, we contrasted either 
humans (anthropocentric speciesism) or dogs (pet speciesism) respectively with chimpanzees 
(animals most similar to humans), elephants (wildlife), or pigs (food animals).  
Similar to the previous two studies, this study had a 2 (condition: emotion vs. 
deliberation) x 2 (speciesism: anthropocentric vs. pet) between-subjects design and was pre-
registered at https://aspredicted.org/y4vf6.pdf.  
Methods 
Participants. We recruited 468 US American participants online via MTurk. They 
received $0.4 for their participation. 33 were excluded for failing the manipulation check, 
leaving a final sample of 435 people (206 female, Mage = 41.72, SDage = 11.86). A priori 
power analysis showed that 403 participants were required to detect an effect size of f = 0.14 
with an α of 0.05, power of 0.80 and 4 groups. We aimed to recruit 460 participants to 
account for any exclusions.  
Procedure. The emotion/deliberation manipulation was identical to the one in the 
previous studies. Next, participants were presented with three separate blocks in randomized 
order involving three moral dilemmas each. Similarly to the dilemma of Study 2, each 
dilemma pitted either humans or dogs against another animal: either chimpanzees, elephants, 
or pigs, depending on the block. One dilemma focused on saving the life of one of two 
beings, another dilemma focused on prioritizing helping one of two harmed beings, and one 
dilemma focused on donating to a charity that either helps one of two types of beings. 
Next, participants were asked follow-up questions similar to Study 2. Again, there were 
three blocks in randomized order for each of the three animals, in which participants were 
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asked three items to measure likability and three to measure moral status attribution. 
Likability was measured by asking which beings they ‘like more’, ‘care more about’, or ‘have 
stronger feelings about’. Moral status attribution was measured by asking which type of being 
‘matters more morally’, ‘should be given higher moral status’, or ‘is morally more valuable’. 
Participants responded to all questions on 7-point response scales. Finally, participants 
responded to demographic questions. 
Results 
Internal reliability for the aggregated dilemma responses was high (αchimpanzees = .92, 
αelephants = .94, αpigs = .91, αcombined = .85). For the analysis we relied on the combined scores.  
The tendency to prioritize a human over the three animals (chimpanzees, elephants, pigs) 
was stronger in the deliberation (M = 6.17, SD = 1.21) compared to the emotion condition (M 
= 5.70, SD = 1.44). In contrast, the tendency to prioritize a dog over the three other animals 
was stronger in the emotion (M = 5.16, SD = 1.55) condition compared to the deliberation 
condition (M = 4.29, SD = 1.34). There was a significant interaction effect between the two 
factors, F(1, 431) = 25.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .05, 95% CI [.02, .10] (Figure 3). Overall, the 
tendency to prioritize the human over the three animals was stronger than the tendency to 
prioritize the dog over the three other animals, F(1, 431) = 78.361, p < .001, ηp2 = .15, 95% 
CI [.10, .21].  
 
LIKING BUT DEVALUING ANIMALS 
 
14 
Figure 3. The tendency to prioritize humans over animals (chimpanzees, elephants, pigs) was 
stronger when participants were asked to rely on deliberation compared to emotion. In 
contrast, the tendency to prioritize dogs over other animals (chimpanzees, elephants, pigs) 
was stronger when participants were asked to rely on emotion compared to deliberation. 1 
stands for prioritizing the “inferior” species (chimpanzees, elephants, pigs), 4 stands for Flip 
a coin to decide, 7 stands for prioritizing the “superior” species (humans or dogs). Black 
points represent raw data, horizontal bars represent means, rectangles represent confidence 
intervals, and “violins” represent smoothed densities. 
 
Internal reliability for the aggregated likability (αchimpanzee = .96, αelephants = .96, αpig = .97, 
αcombined = .87) as well as for the aggregated moral status attribution was high (αchimpanzee = .98, 
αelephants = .97, αpig = .98, αcombined = .93). For the analysis we relied on the combined scores. 
Participants liked humans more than animals (M = 5.45, SD = 1.41), t(222) = 15.34, p < .001, 
d = 1.03, 95% CI [.86, 1.19] and they believed that humans deserve much higher moral status 
than animals (M = 5.61, SD = 1.24), t(222) = 19.26, p < .001, d = 1.29, 95% CI [1.11, 1.47]. 
Participants also liked dogs more than the other animals (M = 5.45, SD = 1.27), t(211) = 
16.60, p < .001, d = 1.14, 95% CI [.97, 1.31]. However, participants believed that dogs 
deserve the same moral status as the other animals (M = 4.06, SD = 0.83), t(211) = 1.08, p =  
0.28, d = .07, 95% CI [-.06, .21]. 
As in the previous study, linear regression revealed that the signs of the interaction terms 
of (a) likability and condition and (b) moral status and condition went in opposite directions 
(Table 2). Again, this means that in the deliberation condition moral status predicted 
donations more strongly than likability, and that in the emotion condition likability predicted 
donations more strongly than moral status. 
 
Table 2. Unstandardized coefficients of regression analysis for the full sample or the two 
condition samples separately (Study 3) 
Sample Full Deliberation Emotion 
R2 0.56 0.60 0.51 
Likeability .65** [.54, .76] .32** [.19, .45] .65** [.54, .76] 
Moral Status .26** [.14, .38] .70** [.58, .82] .26** [.13, .38] 
Condition -.17 [-36, .03]   
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Likability x Condition -.33** [-.50, -.16]   
Moral Status x 
Condition 
.45** [.28, .62]   
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .001. Square brackets display 95% confidence intervals. Continuous 
predictors were uncentered. The continuous predictors were mean-centered. The emotion 
condition was coded as 0 and the deliberation condition as 1. 
 
Discussion 
This study replicates the findings of the previous two studies and demonstrates the 
robustness of our interpretation. Under deliberation compared to emotion people’s tendency 
to prioritize humans over animals (anthropocentric speciesism) is increased. In contrast, 
under emotion compared to deliberation people’s tendency to prioritize dogs over other 
animals (pet speciesism) is increased. As in Study 2, we found that under emotion people’s 
prioritization tendencies are most strongly associated with the extent to which they like the 
respective beings. Under deliberation people’s prioritization tendencies are most strongly 
associated with the extent to which they attribute moral status to the respective beings. 
General Discussion 
Moral philosophers who have argued that speciesism cannot ethically be justified have 
done so by relying on reason (e.g., Regan, 1987; Singer, 1975). Our studies suggest that lay 
people’s thinking partly deviates from that of philosophers. In contrast to philosophers, 
people’s anthropocentric speciesist attitudes increased when thinking deliberatively (using 
reason) compared to thinking emotionally. Their tendency to prioritize humans over animals, 
such as chimpanzees, elephants or pigs, became stronger when they were prompted to think 
deliberately compared to emotionally. The opposite was the case for pet speciesism. In line 
with the reasoning of philosophers, people’s tendency to prioritize dogs over other animals 
became weaker when they were prompted to think deliberately compared to emotionally. 
This asymmetric effect of cognitive processing on speciesism can be explained by differences 
in how much people personally liked the respective beings on the one hand and the moral 
status they attributed to them on the other hand. Despite liking animals as much as humans, 
people believed that humans deserve much higher moral status than animals. In contrast, 
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despite liking dogs much more than pigs, people believed that dogs and pigs deserve roughly 
equal moral status.  
Likability and Moral Status 
Our findings suggest that there are (at least) two underlying factors that are associated 
with how people treat beings of different species: likability and moral status attribution. 
When instructed to rely on emotion, participants tend to rely on likability more than moral 
status; and when instructed to rely on reason, participants tend to rely on moral status more 
than likability. Why is this? 
One possibility is that liking or disliking a being is an automatic and purely emotion-
driven process that does not require advanced cognition. Likability could be a function of 
various evolutionary-based or culturally- and individually-acquired intuitions about animals. 
Such intuitions may include a preference for animals to which people feel socially connected, 
a preference for particularly charismatic animals, or an aversion against disgusting or 
dangerous animals (Amiot & Bastian, 2017; Amiot, Sukhanova, & Bastian, 2019; Loughnan 
& Piazza, 2018). In the context of meat consumption, for example, it has been shown that 
emotional reactions towards animals mediate willingness to eat them: people are more 
reluctant to eat animals that trigger empathy, such as cute and baby animals (Bastian & 
Loughnan, 2016; Piazza, McLatchie, & Olesen, 2018; Zickfeld, Kunst, & Hohle, 2018). As 
we have seen in our studies, most people like animals in general and pet animals—such as 
dogs—in particular. This could explain why pet speciesism, but not anthropocentrism 
speciesism, increases under emotion when people primarily rely on likability. 
 In contrast, thinking about the moral status of a being is a cognitively more demanding 
process. It involves reflecting on one’s beliefs about the reasons for which a being deserves a 
certain moral status. These reasons can go beyond pure intuition and are perhaps more 
susceptible to change as a result of reflecting on moral arguments.  
One reason may be the belief that humans deserve categorically higher moral status than 
other beings. People may partly believe that humans are the most valuable species in an 
absolute sense or that humans have a duty to prioritize members of their own species over 
others (Caviola, Schubert, et al., 2019). Since this factor only applies to humans but not to 
dogs, it could explain why anthropocentric speciesism, but not pet speciesism, increases 
under deliberation, when people primarily rely on moral status attribution. 
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Another reason may be the belief that animals with higher mental capacities (intelligence 
and sentience) deserve higher moral status than animals with lower mental capacities 
(Caviola, Schubert, et al., 2019). People believe that dogs and pigs have roughly similar 
mental capacities (Caviola, Everett, et al., 2019)—a fact that people disregard when justifying 
their meat consumption (Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012; Piazza & Loughnan, 
2016). This, in turn, may lead people to realize that they have no grounds to justify giving 
moral priority to dogs over pigs. As a consequence, pet speciesism decreases under 
deliberation, when people primarily rely on moral status attribution. 
Implications, Limitations and Future Research 
Previous research showed that impartial beneficence remains unaffected by inducing 
either emotional or deliberative thinking (Capraro et al., 2019). We, in contrast, found that 
when thinking emotionally compared to deliberatively, people become more impartial with 
regard to anthropocentrism speciesism and less impartial with regard to pet speciesism. The 
social heuristic hypothesis (Rand, 2016), which assumes that people become more 
cooperative when thinking intuitively, therefore, is in line with the former of the two effects. 
But how can it be reconciled with the fact that people become even more partial towards pet 
animals when thinking emotionally? One answer that we have put forward is that this is due 
to the asymmetric relative strength in likability and moral status that people hold in the case 
of anthropocentric and pet speciesism. However, more research is required to directly link 
likability and moral status to the social heuristic hypothesis. 
In a supplementary study we found that relative to a control condition (i.e., when no 
explicit prompt is given), anthropocentric speciesism both significantly increased in the 
deliberation condition and significantly decreased in the emotion condition. This suggests 
that deliberation can even be counterproductive when trying to reduce anthropocentric 
speciesism. Future research could explore whether there are alternative deliberative paths to 
reduce anthropocentric speciesism such as by presenting moral arguments for why speciesism 
cannot be justified ethically. 
Our conceptual priming technique has its limitations. The technique does not ensure that 
people actually think emotionally or deliberately. Instead, it is possible that they simply 
respond in the way that they believe is emotional or deliberative (Rand, 2016; Capraro, 
Everett, & Earp, 2019; Kvarven et al, 2019). However, in a supplementary study we found 
that even when participants were not explicitly prompted to think in a particular manner, 
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anthropocentric speciesism was still higher in those who indicated that they thought 
deliberately than in those who indicated that they thought emotionally. This supports the 
usefulness of our manipulation and further shows that individual differences in 
anthropocentric speciesism are related to individuals’ typical use of cognitive processes. 
Another limitation of our priming technique is that it did not specify on which emotion 
participants should rely on. If it were assumed that most of the animals in our studies 
generally exhibit positive emotions, it would be plausible to conclude that participants 
generally relied on emotions such as empathy. This is further supported by the fact that 
likability predicted judgments particularly strongly in the emotion conditions. However, it is 
also plausible that other animals such as rats, spiders or hyenas might trigger more negative 
emotions in people, such as anger, contempt or disgust. 
Conclusion 
We find that people’s tendency to prioritize humans over animals (anthropocentric 
speciesism) decreases under emotion compared to deliberation. In contrast, people’s tendency 
to prioritize dogs over other animals, such as chimpanzees, elephants or pigs, (pet speciesism) 
increases under emotion compared to deliberation. These findings show that anthropocentric 
speciesism and pet speciesism are psychologically distinct and driven by different cognitive 
processes. 
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